    github.com/docker/docker 28.5.2+incompatible (golang)
pkg:golang/github.com/docker/docker@28.5.2%2Bincompatible
 Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
| Affected range | <29.3.1 | | Fixed version | 29.3.1 | | CVSS Score | 8.8 | | CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | | EPSS Score | 0.009% | | EPSS Percentile | 1st percentile |
Description
Summary
A security vulnerability has been detected that allows attackers to bypass authorization plugins (AuthZ) under specific circumstances. The base likelihood of this being exploited is low.
This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-41110.
Impact
If you don't use AuthZ plugins, you are not affected.
Using a specially-crafted API request, an attacker could make the Docker daemon forward the request to an authorization plugin without the body. The authorization plugin may allow a request which it would have otherwise denied if the body had been forwarded to it.
Anyone who depends on authorization plugins that introspect the request body to make access control decisions is potentially impacted.
Workarounds
If unable to update immediately:
- Avoid using AuthZ plugins that rely on request body inspection for security decisions.
- Restrict access to the Docker API to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege.
Credits
Resources
 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
| Affected range | <=28.5.2 | | Fixed version | Not Fixed | | CVSS Score | 7.2 | | CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H |
Description
Summary
A race condition during docker cp mount setup allows a malicious container to redirect a bind mount target to an arbitrary host path, potentially overwriting host files or causing denial of service.
Details
When copying files into a container, the daemon sets up a temporary filesystem view by bind-mounting volumes into a private mount namespace. During this setup, the mount destination is created inside the container root and then a bind mount is attached using the container-relative path resolved to an absolute host path.
Between mountpoint creation and the mount() syscall, a process running inside the container can replace the destination (or a parent path component) with a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location on the host. The mount() syscall follows the symlink, causing the volume to be bind-mounted onto an arbitrary host path instead of the intended container path.
Impact
A malicious container can redirect a volume bind mount to an arbitrary host path. The impact depends on the volume content and mount options:
- If the volume is writable, arbitrary host files at the redirected path could be overwritten with the volume's contents.
- If the volume is read-only, the host path is masked by the mount for the duration of the operation, causing denial of service.
- In all cases the mount is temporary (torn down after the
docker cp completes), but the effects of any writes persist.
Conditions for exploitation
- A container must have at least one volume mount.
- A process inside the container must be able to rapidly create and swap symlinks at the volume mount destination path.
- An operator must initiate a
docker cp into that container, or call the PUT /containers/{id}/archive or HEAD /containers/{id}/archive API endpoints.
Not affected
- Containers that do not have volume mounts are not affected, as the race occurs during volume bind-mount setup.
Workarounds
- Only run containers from trusted images.
- Avoid using
docker cp with untrusted running containers.
- Use authorization plugins to restrict access to the archive API endpoints (
PUT /containers/{id}/archive, HEAD /containers/{id}/archive).
 Uncontrolled Search Path Element
| Affected range | <=28.5.2 | | Fixed version | Not Fixed | | CVSS Score | 7.2 | | CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N |
Description
Summary
When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.
Details
When handling PUT /containers/{id}/archive requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.
The executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.
Impact
Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.
Conditions for exploitation
- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary.
- The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via
docker cp - or by calling the PUT /containers/{id}/archive API directly with compressed content.
Not affected
Standard docker cp usage is not affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default:
docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt
This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to docker cp or the PUT /containers/{id}/archive API, for example:
cat archive.tar.xz | docker cp - mycontainer:/dir
Decompression formats using pure Go implementations (bzip2, zstd, and gzip when the container image does not contain an unpigz binary) are also not affected.
Workarounds
- Only run containers from trusted images.
- Use authorization plugins to limit access to the
PUT /containers/{id}/archive endpoint.
- Avoid piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images.
 Off-by-one Error
| Affected range | <29.3.1 | | Fixed version | Not Fixed | | CVSS Score | 6.8 | | CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | | EPSS Score | 0.016% | | EPSS Percentile | 4th percentile |
Description
Summary
A security vulnerability has been detected that allows plugins privilege validation to be bypassed during docker plugin install. Due to an error in the daemon's privilege comparison logic, the daemon may incorrectly accept a privilege set that differs from the one approved by the user.
Plugins that request exactly one privilege are also affected, because no comparison is performed at all.
Impact
If plugins are not in use, there is no impact.
When a plugin is installed, the daemon computes the privileges required by the plugin's configuration and compares them with the privileges approved during installation. A malicious plugin can exploit this bug so that the daemon accepts privileges that differ from what was intended to be approved.
Anyone who depends on the plugin installation approval flow as a meaningful security boundary is potentially impacted.
Depending on the privilege set involved, this may include highly sensitive plugin permissions such as broad device access.
For consideration: exploitation still requires a plugin to be installed from a malicious source, and Docker plugins are relatively uncommon. Docker Desktop also does not support plugins.
Workarounds
If unable to update immediately:
- Do not install plugins from untrusted sources
- Carefully review all privileges requested during
docker plugin install
- Restrict access to the Docker daemon to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege
- Avoid relying on plugin privilege approval as the only control boundary for sensitive environments
Credits
 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
| Affected range | <=28.5.2 | | Fixed version | Not Fixed | | CVSS Score | 6.1 | | CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H |
Description
Summary
A race condition during docker cp mount setup allows a malicious container to create empty files or directories at arbitrary absolute paths on the host filesystem.
This advisory covers the race during mountpoint creation. The related race during the subsequent mount syscall is tracked in GHSA-rg2x-37c3-w2rh
Details
When copying files into a container, the daemon sets up a temporary filesystem view by bind-mounting volumes into a private mount namespace. During this setup, the mount destination path is first resolved within the container's root filesystem using GetResourcePath, and then used to create the mountpoint (file or directory) if it does not already exist via createIfNotExists.
Between path resolution and mountpoint creation, a process running inside the container can swap a path component for a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location on the host. Because createIfNotExists operates on the already-resolved absolute path using standard os.MkdirAll and os.OpenFile — which follow symlinks in intermediate path components — the symlink is followed and the file or directory is created outside the container root filesystem, as root.
Impact
A malicious container can create empty files or directories at arbitrary absolute paths on the host filesystem, running as root. This enables persistent denial of service — for example:
- Converting
/etc/docker/daemon.json into a directory prevents the daemon from restarting
- Creating
/etc/nologin prevents user logins
- Overwriting critical system paths with empty files can break host services
The container does not gain read or write access to existing host files — only the ability to create new empty files or directories at chosen paths.
Conditions for exploitation
- A container must be running with a process that can rapidly create and swap symlinks at a volume mount destination path.
- An operator must initiate a
docker cp into that container, or call the PUT /containers/{id}/archive or HEAD /containers/{id}/archive API endpoints.
Not affected
- Containers that do not have volume mounts are not affected, as the race occurs during volume bind-mount setup.
Patches
Mountpoint creation is now scoped to the container root using os.Root (Go 1.24+), which refuses to follow symlinks that escape the opened root directory. All filesystem operations in createIfNotExists (MkdirAll, OpenFile) are performed through the os.Root handle, so even if a symlink swap occurs after path resolution, the creation stays confined to the container root.
Workarounds
- Only run containers from trusted images.
- Avoid using
docker cp with untrusted running containers.
- Use authorization plugins to restrict access to the archive API endpoints (
PUT /containers/{id}/archive, HEAD /containers/{id}/archive).
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